achievements and failures of sco


China’s growing interest in securing Central Asian oil and gas as well as pursuing other commercial opportunities—areas still dominated by Russian entities, sometimes through local proxies—could lead Beijing to reconsider its policy of regional deference at some point. Also bring out the challenges that India might… First, black-white differences in academic achievement have narrowed since 1970. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an intergovernmental organization founded in Shanghai on 15 June 2001 by six countries, People’s Republic of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The main objectives of the SCO are to (i) strengthen relations among member states; (ii) promote cooperation in political affairs, economics and trade, scientific-technical, cultural, … Marking the tenth anniversary of the RATS in June 2014, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying singled out the value of counterterrorism within the SCO and urged greater cooperation.34 The following month, Foreign Minister Wang Yi offered a five-point proposal that would include creating a “fund-raising mechanism” and further membership enlargement.35 With their ambitions for the SCO frustrated, however, the PRC has recently focused more attention on the CICA, an alternative institution for realizing its regional objectives. 44.“Russia looks East not West for future prosperity,” The Siberian Times, May 6, 2014, http://siberiantimes.com/home/voice-of-siberia/russia-looks-east-not-west-for-future-prosperity/. * Number of nuclear powers in the world has kept on increasing. 15.Wang Yusheng, “SCO shows the Shanghai Spirit,” China Daily, September 12, 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2013-09/12/content_16963300.htm. 36.Xi Jinping, “New Asian Security Concept For New Progress in Security Cooperation,” Chinese Foreign Ministry, May 21, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1159951.shtml. The Business Council of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was founded on June 14, 2006 in Shanghai. The members are divided. SAPTA South Asia Preferential Trading Agreement for promoting trade amonst the member countries came into effect in 1995. China has exploited this opportunity, but cautiously, seeking to avoid alarming either Russia or the Central Asian countries by focusing on economic expansion and constraining its military presence. 11.James Leibold, “Is China’s “Go West” Strategy Doomed?” The National Interest, May 28, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-go-west-strategy-doomed-10542. China implicitly intended to have some check on the emerging great 22.“Vyvod mezhdunarodnykh voisk iz Afganistana vynudit ShOS priniat’ mery po zashchite ot terroristov,” ИТАР-ТАСС, March 28, 2014, http://itar-tass.com/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1081377. Huasheng, Zhao. Among the time periods evaluated, the relationship between DT test scores and creative achievement had the highest correlation at the period of 11–15 years. Supported most closely by Kazakhstan, the CSTO has acquired increasing capabilities and legal authorities in recent years.43, The crisis in Ukraine may lead Russia to relax some of its constraints on the SCO’s further development, especially under its upcoming chairmanship of the organization. 31.Tyler Toney, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: China’s NATO,” The Diplomat, September 11, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/china-power/the-shanghai-cooperation-organization-chinas-nato/. It’s not even halfway through the month of June and the Rising Powers have already had a busy month of summits with their counterparts. Members have declined entreaties by Pakistan, India, Iran, and other countries to become full members. Zhang Xinfeng, director of the RATS executive committee, explained that, “Terrorist attacks in Xinjiang are closely related to the activities of terrorist, separatist and extremist forces in Central Asia, so joint anti-terrorist efforts from the member countries are crucial to China’s stability, and it is a long-term mission.”41 Reaching agreement on counterterrorism is easier than achieving a consensus on more divisive security and economic issues. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, and Sri Lanka all unsuccessfully applied to become formal SCO observers the following year.25 For years, the decreasingly plausible excuse that more time is needed to finalize the legal procedures to admit more members masks collective angst about how expansion might weaken an organization already lacking the internal cohesion found in strong, multilateral institutions such as NATO and the EU.26 Differences in geographic expanse, population size, military power, and economic resources have long made it difficult for members to negotiate and apply collective measures. 21.Xiaob, Sun, “SCO ‘active’ in seeking solution for Afghan security problems,” Global Times, February 14, 2014, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/842415.shtml#.Uv2uE-mPJEo. 45.Feng Yujun, “My View on Contemporary China-Russia Relations,” The Asan Forum 2, no. 152 (July 25, 2014), http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/DetailansichtPubDB_EN?rec_id=3073. After its establishment in 2001, the number of active members, observer countries, and partners has been increasing every year. A SCO common declaration on the UN stated that ‘we [SCO] emphasise the importance of cooperation at different levels on issues related to international peace and security, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations’ (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Joint Declaration on SCO/UN Secretariat Cooperation (5 April 2010)). 4, (2014), http://www.theasanforum.org/us-perspective-3/. 19.Joshua Kucera, “Russia, Uzbekistan Floating Plans To Create ‘Buffer State’ In Afghanistan,” EurasiaNet, April 4, 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68232. 20 (2013), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41471&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=688&no_cache=1#.U2pYMulOXrE. FAILURE OF ASEAN Human right issues:Even a casual perusal of the annual U.S. Human Rights Report shows that everySoutheast Asian state has a blemished human rights record. economic infrastructures, for a multipolar world of peace and harmony among countries willing to join them. Structural disparity between China and other BRICS members: Chinese economy has the largest share among the member countries and it accounts for 38 percent share in the total export of BRICS. 10.Michael Lelyveld, “Central Asia Clash Mars China Gas Plan,” Radio Free Asia, July 28, 2014, http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/energy_watch/plan-07282014110245.html. 2 (2008): 185–202. 2 (2009): 249–281; and Roy Alison, “Virtual Regionalism, Regional Structures and Regime Security in Central Asia,” Central Asian Survey 27, no. On the one hand, the growing ties between Russia and China as well as the withdrawal of the Western powers from Central Asia and Afghanistan could provide it with more cohesive leadership and more opportunities to become Eurasia’s dominant security institution. The National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) data on 17-year … Global Climate Agreements: Successes and Failures International efforts, such as the Paris Agreement, aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Among the creative achievement types, music is predicted the best by IQ and all others are predicted best by DT tests. Here we use a recently developed code and an updated thermochemical database, including gaseous and condensed species involving 34 elements, to compute the chemical equilibrium composition of AGB atmospheres of M-, S-, and C-type stars. 13.“Government May Heed Criticisms of Election,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, November 10, 2006, http://iwpr.net/?p=btj&s=b&o=325286&apc_state=henh. Stories and fairytales are older than Ur. 25.“Meeting of Council of Heads of State of CSO Countries opens in Bishkek,” The Voice of Russia, September 13, 2013, http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2013_09_13/Meeting-of-Council-of-Heads-of-State-of-SCO-Countries-opens-in-Bishkek-9767/. Petra Bendel. They often pursue diverging internal and external foreign economic policies, with differences most evident in their varying commitment to government control of economic activities and their relations to the WTO or the Customs Union established by Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. These multilateral initiatives would have strengthened China’s economic linkages with Central Asia since the PRC was the only SCO member then excluded from the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Community.4 Russian officials, fearful that an inflow of cheap Chinese goods and services as well as capital-rich Chinese state-owned enterprises would drive Russian businesses from the region, argued that economic integration among SCO countries should occur gradually, over the course of decades—conveniently preserving Moscow’s economic advantages in the interim.5 The Russian government, which was more badly affected by the recent global economic crisis than the PRC, declined to join Beijing in 2009 to co-fund a SCO stabilization fund and has been unenthusiastic about Chinese efforts to create a multibillion-dollar SCO development bank.6 A Beijing-backed agreement on road transport has been similarly stalled, allegedly because “a member state failed to have the documents ready” at the 2013 SCO prime ministers’ summit in Tashkent.7 Russia has sought to compensate for China’s growing economic presence in Central Asia through bilateral economic ties and alternative multilateral economic institutions such as the trilateral Customs Union and more recently the Eurasian Union—institutions that exclude China and are dominated by Moscow. On the other hand, the SCO faces … “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization at 5: Achievements and Challenges Ahead.” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly. 23.“Potential SCO members should sign earlier agreements,” Itar-Tass, July 9, 2014, http://in.rbth.com/news/2014/07/09/potential_sco_members_should_sign_earlier_agreements_36571.html. 7.“SCO prime ministers’ meeting injects impetus into practical cooperation,” Xinhua, November 30, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/30/c_132930676.htm. What all these approaches have in common is a minimal role assigned to the SCO. After a series of annual heads-of-state summits among these “Shanghai Five,” the participating countries decided to formalize these ties in 2001 by creating a permanent organization and extending their initial border demilitarization talks to encompass broader security, economic, and other regional cooperation in Central Asia. The SCO Development Strategy adopted at Ufa challenged Western values and demanded respect for cultural-civilizational diversity, but the SCO governments have … * Failed to generate a universal consensus to protect the deteriorating world climate, even at Copenhagen in 2009. The Chinese have often seen the SCO as “their” organization, endowing it with almost mystical qualities. Yet, the continuing low-key Sino-Russian rivalry minimizes the risk of the SCO institutionalizing a China-Russia condominium, leading them to embrace the organization as well. 3. But without a clear mission or cohesion among its growing body of members, the SCO will struggle to produce concrete achievements. To the surprise of many, including its members, the SCO rapidly became one of Eurasia’s most influential multinational institutions. Most Central Asian leaders consider the PRC less as an alternative great power patron to Russia than as a supplementary partner to assist them in moderating Moscow’s predominance as well as furthering their economic development. The value of these multiple reassurances means that the SCO will remain a viable institution despite its modest results and constrained potential due to the mutual vetoes that handicap its ability to adapt to changing regional circumstances and advance mutual interests. 28.Matthew Crosston, “The Strange Case of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” New Eastern Outlook, June 6, 2014, http://journal-neo.org/2014/05/06/the-strange-case-of-the-shanghai-cooperation-organization/. Pour autoriser Verizon Media et nos partenaires à traiter vos données personnelles, sélectionnez 'J'accepte' ou 'Gérer les paramètres' pour obtenir plus d’informations et pour gérer vos choix. Since multiple voices often carry more weight than speaking alone, the member governments try to align their foreign policy statements. The Central Asian countries would then become a more explicit target of China-Russia rivalry, A downturn in China-Russia relations, or a loss of Beijing’s confidence in Moscow’s ability to maintain security in Central Asia, which would jeopardize core Chinese economic and security interests, could lead China to abandon its policy of regional deference and pursue a more assertive regional security role, either through the CICA or through bilateral initiatives with regional partners. The SCO’s full members (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) and formal observers (Afghanistan, India, Iran, Pakistan, and Mongolia) include some of the world’s leading energy exporters and importers, as well as major military powers (several with nuclear weapons). 48.Jeffrey Mankoff, “The Ukraine Crisis and the Future of Sino-Russian Relations,” The Asan Forum 2, no. 2.Sun Zhuangzhi and Zhang Ning, “Debate: SCO,” China Daily, June 13, 2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011SCOsummit/2011-06/13/content_12681174.htm. After the inclusion of Uzbekistan in 2001, the Shanghai Five was renamed to become the SCO. The organization has difficulty transforming words into deeds. The PRC has provided billions of dollars of loans and development aid to fellow SCO members, but these funds are often tied to purchasing Chinese products and services, building infrastructure to develop and transport their natural resources to China, and otherwise promoting Beijing’s national interests under the rubric of the SCO. President Xi Jinping is but the latest leader to perceive a “Shanghai Spirit” of “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation [and] respect,” underpinning the organization’s work and differentiating the SCO from other multinational institutions.31 He has continued to pursue an economically dominant agenda centered on reviving the Silk Road using railroads, highways, pipelines, and other modern transportation and communications networks.32 Xi has also followed his predecessors in advocating establishing a SCO Development Bank, based in China and with shares allocated on the basis of relative financial contributions, to develop regional infrastructure, and an energy club that would benefit a resource rich but energy needy Chinese nation.33 Russians have not overtly opposed China’s growing economic presence, which can strengthen local economies and lessen resource demands on Moscow. 20.“SCO Won’t Take Over From NATO in Afghanistan – Envoy,” RIA Novosti, January 15, 2014, http://en.ria.ru/world/20140115/186554000/SCO-Wont-Take-Over-From-NATO-in-Afghanistan–Envoy.html. The PRC sees the SCO as a means to expand its influence in Central Asia without alarming Moscow, whereas Russia values the SCO as a mechanism to monitor and restrain that expansion. 49.Zhao Huasheng, “China-Russia Relations in Central Asia,” The Asan Forum 1, no. The organization’s role in Afghanistan would increase if Pakistan, India, or Iran realized its aspirations to become full SCO members. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) stands at a pivotal point in its history. The SCO also includes two non-governmental bodies, the SCO Business Council and the SCO Interbank Consortium. Other governments prefer working through the SCO because, unlike the CSTO or Eurasian Union, it is not dominated by Russia. SCO members still impose many trade and investment barriers against one another and are more open to economic engagement with non-Eurasian partners than with each other. The SCO has also developed contacts with other important multilateral organizations, including obtaining observer status in the UN General Assembly and establishing formal ties with several UN agencies as well as the CSTO, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and other multinational groups, most recently the CICA.1 Yet, to all appearances, the SCO has lost momentum and even a sense of strategic purpose in the last few years. The two most powerful members, China and Russia, devote more attention to their relations with individual Central Asian states than to their SCO-mediated multilateral ties, though they strive to give their bilateral activities a multilateral gloss. The SCO became one of the largest (in terms of geographic size and population) regional organizations with a most comprehensive agenda. Chung, Chien. It has not challenged the growing security role of the CSTO, sold major weapons to Central Asian militaries that traditionally have purchased arms from Russia, or established a military base in the region. 30.“Chinese FM meets Russian, Kyrgyz, Uzbek counterparts on ties,” Xinhua, July 31, 2014, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/xinhua-news-agency/140731/chinese-fm-meets-russian-kyrgyz-uzbek-counterparts-ties. His parents divorced and later in 1954 his mother, Esther J. The governments have remained deadlocked over the SCO’s appropriate security functions and ambitions, suitable energy and other non-security dimensions, how to manage the Western withdrawal from Afghanistan, and whether to expand the number of full members–and which states should receive this status. The two share critical interests in Central Asia—preventing social revolutions, combatting transnational terrorism, limiting Western influence, and constraining the local elites—that they can best advance in partnership rather than through rivalry. Richard Weitz. SAFTA A Free Trade Agreement confined to goods, but excluding all services like information technology. 18.“Karzai calls fighting ‘terrorism’ a shared responsibility at SCO Summit,” Tolo News, September 14, 2013, http://tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/11923-karzai-changes-stand-calls-fighting-terrorism-a-qshared-responsibility. Most often, the SCO serves as a weak multilateral framework that members use to coordinate regional policies and pursue individual “micro-agendas.”28 The essential ethos of the SCO is that states have the right to limit their participation in its activities and, thanks to a consensus decision making rule, can easily block collective measures, though members can and do pursue such initiatives through bilateral and unilateral policies.29 SCO gatherings typically have more important side meetings to address issues outside the organization’s purview.30 Most often, accords adopted under the organization’s auspices consist primarily of bilateral deals, with the organization merely providing a convenient negotiating venue. Timothy Colton, Timothy Frye, and Robert Legvold (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2010), 17; and “Proposed Study of Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Development Bank,” December 1, 2010, http://www.china-daily.org/China-News/Proposed-study-of-establishment-of-the-Shanghai-Cooperation-Organization-Development-Bank/. 9.Joshua Kucera, “Tajikistan’s Folly? Chemical equilibrium has proven extremely useful to predict the chemical composition of AGB atmospheres. Russia and China are leading this drive, without any seeming objection from other SCO members.42 To address more conventional security challenges, Russian officials have focused on augmenting the CSTO, which includes all the SCO members except China. 5 (2006): 3-14. Richard Weitz, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis, Hudson Institute, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011SCOsummit/2011-06/13/content_12681174.htm, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t162437.htm, http://en.rian.ru/analysis /20060920/54104304.html, http://www.china-daily.org/China-News/Proposed-study-of-establishment-of-the-Shanghai-Cooperation-Organization-Development-Bank/, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/30/c_132930676.htm, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41471&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=688&no_cache=1#.U2pYMulOXrE, http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/central-asia-tajikistan-rogun-vakhsh-river-dam-impoverished-uzbekistan-worldbank-UN, http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/energy_watch/plan-07282014110245.html, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-go-west-strategy-doomed-10542, http://www.theasanforum.org/the-legacy-of-the-1980s-for-russias-relations-in-northeast-asia-in-the-2010s/, http://iwpr.net/?p=btj&s=b&o=325286&apc_state=henh, http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_05_23/Colored-revolutions-threaten-global-stability-Russian-Defense-Minister-7815, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2013-09/12/content_16963300.htm, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/HRIC_parallel_report_Kazakhstan_Annex1HRC102.pdf, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2013-09/13/c_132719272.htm, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-08/01/c_133524872.htm, http://tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/11923-karzai-changes-stand-calls-fighting-terrorism-a-qshared-responsibility, http://en.ria.ru/world/20140115/186554000/SCO-Wont-Take-Over-From-NATO-in-Afghanistan–Envoy.html, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/842415.shtml#.Uv2uE-mPJEo, http://in.rbth.com/news/2014/07/09/potential_sco_members_should_sign_earlier_agreements_36571.html, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/12/content_6020343.htm, http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2013_09_13/Meeting-of-Council-of-Heads-of-State-of-SCO-Countries-opens-in-Bishkek-9767/, http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/the-shanghai-cooperation-organization-and-central-asian-security/, http://en.rian.ru/world/20080415/105121712.html, http://journal-neo.org/2014/05/06/the-strange-case-of-the-shanghai-cooperation-organization/, http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/DetailansichtPubDB_EN?rec_id=3073, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/xinhua-news-agency/140731/chinese-fm-meets-russian-kyrgyz-uzbek-counterparts-ties, http://thediplomat.com/china-power/the-shanghai-cooperation-organization-chinas-nato/, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42466&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=ccf68aa4529c12f2ba3238b309e84ea8#.U53bfulOWWw, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-09/13/c_132719334.htm, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/n/2014/0618/c90785-8743206.html, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1159951.shtml, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-05/21/content_17531900.htm, http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2014/05/22/china-treads-carefully-as-it-pursues-influence, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1101&MainCatID=11&id=20140522000134, http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/article_xinhua.aspx?id=213334, http://www.euronews.com/newswires/2543328-china-to-boost-anti-terror-cooperation-with-central-asia/, http://en.ria.ru/russia/20140606/190392662/Russia-China-Should-Boost-Potential-of-Regional-Organizations-.html, http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/DetailansichtPubDB_EN?rec_id=3071, http://siberiantimes.com/home/voice-of-siberia/russia-looks-east-not-west-for-future-prosperity/, http://www.theasanforum.org/chinese-view/, http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/chin-backs-russia-on-ukraine/, http://www.theasanforum.org/us-perspective-3/, http://www.theasanforum.org/china-russia-relations-in-central-asia/, http://english.scosummit2006.org/en_zxbb/2006-06/15/content_755.htm, Recent Views in Japan Concerning Sino-Russian Relations, Danielle F. S. Cohen (assisted by Dong Jiaxin). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Growing Pains. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) stands at a pivotal point in its history. Successes of the United Nations. 2. 35.“China strives for SCO development, FMs urge bigger UN role,” Xinhua, August 1, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-08/01/c_133524872.htm. 17.See for example last year’s summit communique as described in Zhu Ninghzhu, “SCO Leaders Vow to Jointly Tackle Global Threats,” Xinhua, September 13, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2013-09/13/c_132719272.htm; and “China strives for SCO development, FMs urge bigger UN role,” Xinhua, August 1, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-08/01/c_133524872.htm.